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Abstract 
The potential of blockchain has been extensively discussed in practitioner literature, yet rigorous 
empirical and theory-driven information systems (IS) research on blockchain remains scarce. This 
special issue addresses the need for innovative research that offers a fresh look at the opportunities 
and challenges of blockchain. This editorial integrates and goes beyond the papers included in this 
special issue by providing a framework for blockchain research in IS that emphasizes two important 
issues. First, we direct the attention of IS research toward the blockchain protocol level, which is 
characterized by recursive interactions between human agents and the blockchain protocol. Second, 
we highlight the need for IS research to consider how the protocol level constrains and affords 
blockchain applications, and how these constraints and other concerns at the application level lead 
to changes at the protocol level. Rooted in a sociomaterial view of IS, we offer a multi-paradigmatic 
IS research agenda that underscores the need for behavioral (individual, group, and organizational), 
design science, and IS economics research on blockchain. Our research agenda emphasizes issues of 
blockchain governance, human and material agency, blockchain affordances and constraints, as well 
as the consequences of its use. 
Keywords: Blockchain, Distributed Ledger Technology, Behavioral, Design Science, Economics 
of IS, Research Agenda. 
Suprateek Sarker was the accepting senior editor. This editorial was submitted on April 4, 2019 and went through one 
round of revision. 
1 Introduction 
A blockchain is an append-only distributed database 
of transactions, characterized by high tamper-
resistance, despite the lack of defined central 
operator. Blockchains are believed to fundamentally 
transform our economies and societies by lowering 
transaction costs and reducing the need for trusted 
third parties (Catalini & Gans, 2016; Clemons, 
Dewan, Kauffman, & Weber, 2017; Iansiti & 
Lakhani, 2017).  
Blockchain’s potential to transform markets and 
societies has motivated public and private 
organizations to make deep investments. Investors 
have backed blockchain-enabled cryptocurrencies 
such as Bitcoin, which have attracted substantial 
interest in financial markets (Mai, Shan, Bai, Wang, 
& Chiang, 2018) and mixed assessments from 
regulators (Guo & Liang, 2016). More ambitious 
applications have also been proposed, most of which 
rely on blockchain-based smart contracts, i.e., 
algorithms stored on the blockchain, meaning that 
their execution is de facto guaranteed (Buterin, 2014). 
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Recently, a joint venture between Maersk and IBM 
was announced that aims to substantially increase the 
efficiency and security of moving products across the 
globe (Nærland, Mueller-Bloch, Beck, & Palmund, 
2017). Collectively, important actors agree that 
blockchain could impact many aspects of our 
societies from environmental sustainability 
(Chapron, 2017) to healthcare (Gammon, 2018) and 
social networks (Ciriello, Beck, & Thatcher, 2018).  
While organizations have invested in exploring 
blockchain’s potential, information systems (IS) 
research investigating blockchain remains scarce. 
Some early work has offered insight into the design 
of applications based on blockchain-based smart 
contracts (e.g., Egelund-Müller, Elsman, Henglein, & 
Ross, 2017). Other work has examined the use of 
cryptocurrencies in practice. For example, Li and 
Wang (2017) conducted an empirical study on the 
determinants of cryptocurrency exchange rates in the 
case of Bitcoin.  
Despite such exceptions, scant work in IS contributes 
to forming a theory-driven or rigorous empirically 
derived understanding of blockchain and its 
implications (Beck, Avital, Rossi, & Thatcher, 2017). 
This special issue jump-starts the scholarly 
conversation about blockchain in two important and 
meaningful ways: first, by presenting cutting-edge IS 
research addressing this gap and, second, by 
employing this editorial to set an agenda for future IS 
research studying the opportunities and challenges of 
blockchain. This special issue emphasizes inclusivity 
by considering three major paradigms in IS research 
(behavioral, design, and economics), both in terms of 
the three papers included in the special issue and with 
respect to the research directions provided in this 
editorial. We will now provide an overview of the 
three papers in the special issue and subsequently 
present our own thoughts and suggestions for 
blockchain research in the IS community.  
To begin with, in “Self-Organising in Blockchain 
Infrastructures: Generativity Through Shifting 
Objectives and Forking,” Andersen and Ingram 
Bogusz develop the idea of self-organizing 
infrastructures. This is achieved through a 
longitudinal case study of forking within the Bitcoin 
blockchain infrastructure. The case reveals how 
diverging objectives of different implementer groups 
lead to forks that can result in incompatible 
subversions of the infrastructure. These are 
interpreted as manifestations of self-organizing 
within the growing community. The main theoretical 
contribution here is the description of different 
patterns of self-organizing within the Bitcoin 
community and their connection to development 
events. 
In the second paper, “Privacy-Preserving Data 
Certification in the Internet of Things: Leveraging 
Blockchain Technology to Protect Sensor Data,” 
Chanson, Bogner, Bilgeri, Fleisch, and Wortmann 
follow a design science research methodology to 
develop a blockchain solution for Internet-of-things 
(IoT) systems in the context of used cars. The paper 
deals with the problem of insecure communications 
and data storage in IoT devices by iteratively 
designing a blockchain-based system for protecting 
IoT sensor data. The design principles derived are 
evaluated by experts in an ex post evaluation step and 
then reported as an initial design theory for protecting 
IoT sensor data generation and processing. This paper 
combines a novel design, design theorizing, and 
practical implications, which is rare in one design 
science research paper. 
Finally, in “Business on Chain: A Comparative Case 
Study of Five Blockchain-Inspired Business 
Models,” Hua, Chong, Lim, Zheng, and Tan examine 
how firms leverage blockchain to create and capture 
value in novel ways. Through an exploratory 
comparative, multiple case-study approach, the 
authors analyzed the experience of five companies in 
mainland China that rolled out blockchain initiatives. 
From these case analyses, they derived a typology of 
five blockchain-inspired business models 
(platformer, disintermediator, mediator, transformer, 
and co-innovator), each of which embodies 
distinctive logics for market differentiation. In doing 
so, they offer insights into each model’s value 
creation logic, its value capturing mechanism, and the 
challenges that could threaten its longer-term 
viability. 
This editorial is structured as follows. In Section 2, 
we articulate our key concerns about blockchain 
research in the IS field and introduce a framework 
that directs the IS discipline’s attention beyond 
blockchain’s applications toward understanding the 
blockchain protocol level and its interactions with 
blockchain applications. In Section 3, we discuss 
critical issues at the blockchain protocol level and 
their interactions with blockchain applications, both 
of which we deem important for future IS research on 
blockchain. In Section 4, we use the framework to 
provide a forward-looking research agenda that 
connects blockchain to three major paradigms of IS 
research: behavioral (individual, group, and 
organizational), design, and economics. Section 5 
concludes.
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2 A Framework for Blockchain 
Research in Information Systems 
Recent work in top IS journals has emphasized 
blockchain’s potential to transform organizations and 
economies. Beck, Mueller-Bloch, and King (2018) 
explore the new forms of governance and 
organizations that may be sparked by blockchain, 
while Clemons et al. (2017) articulate the broader 
economic changes that blockchain may trigger. 
Others focus on blockchain’s ramifications for 
specific firm competencies such as business process 
management (Mendling et al., 2018) or accounting 
(Dai & Vasarhelyi, 2017), or specific industries such 
as Fintech (Gomber, Kauffman, Parker, & Weber, 
2018) or e-government (Ølnes, Ubacht, & Janssen, 
2017). All of these papers emphasize different facets 
of blockchain research in IS. Most of these articles 
direct attention to blockchain as a tool or application 
to solve business or societal problems.  
While studying applications is consistent with the IS 
tradition, we believe our discipline needs to go 
beyond examining specific blockchain applications 
and toward understanding the broader implications of 
blockchain protocols. We do so, since not only extant 
work on blockchain in leading IS journals, but also 
the majority of the 37 special issue submissions focus 
on applications of blockchain to business problems. 
While such research is important, extending our 
field’s focus to examining the blockchain protocol 
level as well as its interactions with the blockchain 
application level is critical for IS research to 
contribute to a more refined understanding of the 
sociomateriality of blockchain.  
The key artifact of the blockchain protocol level is the 
blockchain protocol. It defines the technical rules 
under which the blockchain is produced. Table 1 
shows that these rules, in particular, pertain to human 
agents’ rights to validate transactions (as defined in 
the consensus protocol) and to read and submit 
transactions (Peters & Panayi, 2016). For instance, 
Bitcoin’s blockchain protocol excludes human 
agents1 neither from validating transactions nor from 
reading and submitting transactions. Therefore, it 
would be classified as permissionless and public, 
according to Table 1. The blockchain protocol also 
incorporates additional rules, such as the existence 
and extent of transaction fees and the maximum 
number of transactions the blockchain can handle 
within a given time. However, at the blockchain 
protocol level, we find more than just “mere” 
technology in the form of the actual blockchain 
protocol; indeed, it is characterized by recursive 
interactions between human agents and the 
blockchain protocol. Blockchain protocols not only 
result from extensive negotiations over design 
choices between human agents, they also require 
constant affirmation and renegotiation of the agents 
over these rules, and changes to the protocol may 
follow. Moreover, human agents can undermine the 
blockchain protocol. At the same time, the blockchain 
protocol exerts material agency.2 It directly governs 
the interactions of human agents by mediating their 
competition, cooperation, conflicts, and conflict 
resolution. Human agents govern the blockchain 
protocol, and the blockchain protocol governs their 
interactions. Therefore, blockchain directs attention 
not only to governance of information technology, but 
also to governance through information technology. 
The blockchain protocol is imbricated with the 
human agents’ social world. This means that both are 
simultaneously interdependent, yet maintain their 
distinct irreducible character (Leonardi, 2011; 
Sassen, 2006). Over time, the interweaving of human 
agency and material agency (i.e., the blockchain 
protocol) may become taken for granted (“black-
boxed”) and, therefore, infrastructure, or more 
specifically, blockchain infrastructure, may be taken 
for granted as well (Star & Ruhleder, 1996; see also 
Andersen and Ingram Bogusz in this special issue). 
Besides the protocol level itself, there are critical 
interactions between the protocol level and the 
application level, given that the protocol level exerts 
affordances and constraints on applications and that 
actions at the protocol level are shaped by concerns 
about applicability and other developments at the 
application level. In this context, salient concerns 
include privacy, scalability, security, and 
environmental sustainability (we elaborate on these 
issues and their relevance for IS research in Section 3 
of this editorial). Both the protocol level itself and its 
interactions with blockchain applications therefore 
merit special attention from an IS perspective. Our 
proposed framework for IS research on blockchain 
integrates the above thoughts and ideas and guides 
our directions for future research (see Figure 1). We 
elaborate in the next two subsections and then 
conclude in the third subsection by addressing the 
state of IS research on blockchain applications.
 
1 In this paper, we use the terms “human agent” and “agent” 
interchangeably. Whenever we refer to material agents, we 
explicitly state it. 
2 Leonardi (2011) defines material agency as “the capacity 
for nonhuman entities to act on their own, apart from 
human intervention.” 
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Table 1. Key Dimensions of the Blockchain Protocol 
 
Access to transaction validation 
Access to transactions Permissioned Permissionless 
Public All agents can read and submit 
transactions. Only authorized 
agents can validate transactions. 
All agents can read, submit, and 
validate transactions. 
Private Only authorized agents can read, 
submit, and validate transactions. 
Not applicable 
 
 
2.1 The Blockchain Protocol Level 
First, studying the protocol level represents fertile 
ground for important IS research since, at the 
protocol level, human agents interact within the rules 
set by the blockchain protocol, while at the same 
time negotiating these rules via the blockchain 
protocol. A discussion of consensus protocols, 
perhaps the most salient aspect of blockchain 
protocols, reveals how the protocol level is 
sociomaterial: Given that blockchains function 
without a defined central operator, there is a need to 
avoid disagreement about what information is stored 
on the blockchain. A lack of consensus would lead 
to the creation of alternative blockchains known as 
forks (Andersen & Ingram Bogusz, 2019; Decker & 
Wattenhofer, 2013). Consensus protocols address 
the issue by specifying how the right to validate new 
transactions (which are stored in batches called 
blocks—hence the name “blockchain”) is assigned. 
They do so by defining the basic rules that distribute 
 
3 Beyond negotiations of agents directly mediated by the 
consensus protocol, agents also negotiate and constantly 
decision-making power among human agents. For 
instance, in the proof-of-work consensus protocol 
used by Bitcoin, decision-making power is 
distributed proportionally to the expenditure of 
computational power without external utility (i.e., 
mining). The agent with the most decision-making 
power is most likely to accrue the right to add a new 
block to the blockchain. Randomization in the 
consensus protocol ensures that the agent with the 
most decision-making power does not acquire the 
right to validate every block, which is crucial since a 
high degree of centralization of decision-making 
power threatens the blockchain’s integrity (Bano et 
al., 2017; Tschorsch & Scheuermann, 2017).  
What is important for IS research is that in this 
context the actions of human agents exert a powerful 
influence on the blockchain. 3  Mediated by the 
protocol, the agents most often achieve consensus, 
but their behavior can also induce forks—both 
incidentally and deliberately. These forks can have 
renegotiate the blockchain protocol in other social spaces 
such as online forums or in physical meetings. 
 
Figure 1. Framework for Blockchain Research in Information Systems 
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different consequences, such as the creation of 
alternative histories of transactions (typically the 
case with incidental forks), changes to the 
blockchain protocol, or both (typically the case with 
deliberate forks) (Andersen & Ingram Bogusz, 
2019). In addition to inducing forks, agent behavior 
can also actively undermine the blockchain’s 
integrity, such as when one agent seeking to 
undermine the blockchain were to obtain the 
majority of decision-making power in the consensus 
protocol. In blockchains with proof-of-work as a 
consensus mechanism, for example, this would be 
possible if the agent possessed more than half of the 
computing power used to mine new blocks 
(Nakamoto, 2008). Another aspect is that the 
presence of agents is needed to run and secure the 
blockchain: if agents willing to participate in the 
consensus protocol are absent, transactions cannot be 
added to the blockchain and the blockchain’s 
integrity is compromised. Clearly, issues of 
governance, as well as agents’ motives and 
incentives, are critical for the blockchain protocol 
level. Given the sociomaterial nature of these 
themes, we believe IS research is a natural fit for the 
area. First IS research of this kind is emerging only 
recently. For instance, Qin, Yuan, and Wang (2019) 
study reward mechanisms in proof-of-work mining 
pools. 
2.2 Interactions between Blockchain 
Protocol Level and Blockchain 
Application Level 
Second, there are important interactions between the 
protocol level and the application level. Different 
blockchain protocols constrain and afford different 
applications and uses (Glaser, 2017). For example, 
private blockchains may be better suited for 
supporting the operations of incumbent players such 
as governments and established companies, given 
their higher degree of centralized control and 
confidentiality. However, not only the blockchain 
protocol itself, but also the imbrication of human 
agents and the blockchain protocol, constrains and 
affords applications. For instance, if one agent 
accumulates a lot of decision-making power in the 
consensus protocol, the blockchain’s integrity is at 
stake and any blockchain application is at risk. Vice 
versa, the protocol level is shaped by the application 
level, as concerns about applicability or 
developments at the application level lead to changes 
at the protocol level. These changes can either take 
the form of modifications of human agent behavior 
or modifications to the blockchain protocol. There 
 
4 https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoins-price-surge-is-
making-hobby-mining-profitable-again 
are examples of both instances. In terms of the 
former, high demand for Bitcoin and, therefore, high 
prices incentivized agents to participate in the 
consensus protocol to earn mining rewards.4 In terms 
of the latter, concerns about limited throughput led 
to several Bitcoin forks, where groups of developers 
set up alternatives to Bitcoin by changing the Bitcoin 
protocol to allow for increased scalability (Andersen 
& Ingram Bogusz, 2019). Overall, refocusing IS 
blockchain research on the interactions between the 
protocol level and the application level might allow 
for a richer understanding of the blockchain 
phenomenon. For example, a recent paper (Pedersen, 
Risius, & Beck, 2019) discusses not only in which 
application contexts it makes sense to use a 
blockchain, but also clarifies which blockchain to 
use in which context. 
2.3 The Blockchain Application Level 
Most IS research on blockchain has thus far focused 
on the application level, which concerns how 
blockchain can be applied to business problems or 
societal issues. Many proposed blockchain 
applications are based on the idea of using smart 
contracts, which are not unique to blockchain 
(Halaburda, 2018). At the same time, many believe 
that smart contracts, when paired with blockchain, 
may be particularly beneficial in leading to outcomes 
such as disintermediation (Clemons et al., 2017). 
The other salient application area of blockchain is 
cryptocurrencies. It should be noted that 
cryptocurrencies play a role both at the protocol level 
and the application level, depending on the context. 
For instance, cryptocurrencies play a protocol-level, 
role if the focus is on analyzing the way they 
incentivize the participation of agents in the 
consensus protocol. However, cryptocurrencies can 
also play a role at the application level when, for 
example, the focus is on whether users perceive 
cryptocurrency to be a currency or an asset. 5 
However, because we focus primarily on the 
protocol level, our framework does not specifically 
address the application level. 
Nevertheless, research on blockchain applications is 
indeed important, particularly for understanding the 
consequences of blockchain’s use. Claims that the 
advent of blockchain and blockchain-based smart 
contracts may have substantial implications for trust 
(Beck, Czepluch, Lollike, & Malone, 2016), 
transaction costs, and intermediaries (Catalini & 
Gans, 2016; Clemons et al., 2017; Iansiti & Lakhani, 
2017) can be empirically assessed in application 
contexts. Even though IS blockchain research 
5  Glaser, Zimmermann, Haferkorn, Weber, and Siering 
(2014) investigate whether users perceive Bitcoin as a 
currency or as an investment vehicle.  
Blockchain Research in Information Systems 
 
1395 
concerning the application level is published more 
frequently than research on the protocol level, there 
is still a need for more theory-driven and empirically 
rigorous work on the application level. Our argument 
is, therefore, not to shift the focus of IS research on 
blockchain away from the application level, but to go 
beyond the applications by also considering the 
protocol level, as well as interactions between the 
levels. Thus, this editorial offers a research agenda 
for blockchain research in IS that accounts for these 
areas. Our research agenda is inclusive, spanning the 
three main paradigms in IS research (behavioral, 
design, economics), all of which can make valuable 
and important contributions to further our 
understanding of blockchain. In the next chapter, we 
will provide a brief discussion of critical issues at the 
protocol level to serve as important cornerstones for 
our research agenda. 
3 Critical Issues at the Blockchain 
Protocol Level and Their 
Interactions with the Blockchain 
Application Level 
Our framework suggests several opportunities for 
future blockchain research within IS that take the 
protocol level into account, either by focusing on the 
protocol level exclusively or by considering the 
interactions between the protocol level and 
application level. In particular, we direct the 
attention of IS researchers toward issues of 
information privacy, scalability, security, and 
environmental sustainability. All of these are 
important because they exert affordances and 
constraints on blockchain applications, and are also 
shaped by concerns at the application level. In 
particular, issues of information privacy, security, 
and environmental sustainability are also inherently 
sociomaterial, which makes them potential IS 
research areas, even if concrete application scenarios 
are not taken into account.  
Information privacy refers to the ability to control 
the acquisition and use of an individual’s personal 
information (Westin, 1967). Privacy concerns arise 
in the context of blockchain since, in most 
blockchains, transactions are not anonymous but 
pseudonymous. Transactions can be traced back to 
their initiator and recipient, who can be identified 
through their public addresses. Previous research has 
shown that users are often not aware of the issue 
(Fabian, Ermakova, & Sander, 2016), even though it 
has been demonstrated that it may be possible to 
reveal users’ real-world identities (Meiklejohn et al., 
2013; Reid & Harrigan, 2013; Yin et al., 2019). To 
 
6 https://cointelegraph.com/bitcoin-cash-for-
beginners/what-is-bitcoin-cash#story-of-the-hard-fork 
address the issue, anonymous blockchains such as 
Monero obfuscate their users’ identities (Kumar, 
Fischer, Tople, & Saxena, 2017). However, such 
blockchains are often used for criminal purposes 
such as ransomware attacks and transactions on 
darknet marketplaces. Moreover, their privacy-
preserving mechanisms can be compromised, even 
though countermeasures have been proposed (Möser 
et al., 2018). 
Scalability refers to the number of transactions a 
blockchain can process within a given time. It is 
another major concern when blockchains are used. A 
number of ways to address the issue have been 
suggested (Croman et al., 2016). One way to foster 
blockchain scalability is to conduct transactions off-
chain. It is, however, likely that the resulting 
performance improvements are also associated with 
increased centralization, and it is unclear if protocols 
conducting transactions off-chain can outperform 
blockchains such as Bitcoin’s overall (Croman et al. , 
2016). Another commonly proposed approach to 
promoting scalability is to increase the block size so 
that blocks can contain a higher number of 
transactions. However, increasing block size may 
increase the number of forks and the possibilities for 
double-spending attacks (Karame, Androulaki, 
Roeschlin, Gervais, & Čapkun, 2015; Vukolic, 
2015). Moreover, similar to conducting transactions 
off-chain, there are concerns that increasing block 
size might foster centralization in the consensus 
protocol. 6  The example of Steemit, a blockchain-
based social network, illustrates how 
decentralization is sacrificed for scalability (Ciriello 
et al., 2018).  
Such a trade-off may impede security since the 
blockchain’s integrity, and thus its tamper-
resistance, is contingent on decentralization of 
decision-making power in the consensus protocol (as 
discussed in Section 2.1). Agents with a high degree 
of decision-making power in the consensus protocol 
could attack the blockchain by double-spending 
cryptocurrency, effectively spending more than they 
own (Gervais et al., 2016). However, attacks on 
consensus protocols do not necessarily have to be 
motivated by profit. Such Goldfinger attacks can be 
motivated by political or social aims (Kroll, Davey, 
& Felten, 2013). Strategies for obtaining decision-
making power in consensus protocols may also vary. 
For instance, given that computing power does not 
have to be bought but can also be rented, it might be 
less costly to compromise blockchains relying on 
proof-of-work consensus protocols than is often 
assumed (Bonneau, 2018). Besides matters of 
centralization in the consensus protocol, other 
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security issues are also important. For example, 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks occur 
frequently (Vasek, Thornton, & Moore, 2014). 
Blockchain-based smart contracts are also affected 
by security issues given that coding errors can have 
major consequences (Beck et al., 2018).  
Consensus protocols are also of importance due to 
issues of environmental sustainability. 7 Proof-of-
work, still the most prominent consensus 
mechanism, assigns the right to add a new block to 
the blockchain based on the expenditure of 
computing power (Nakamoto, 2008). In practice, this 
has led to an arms race with ever-expanding energy 
consumption. Alternative consensus mechanisms, 
including proof-of-stake and delegated proof-of-
stake, address these concerns. Proof-of-stake averts 
the issue by assigning the right to validate a new 
block based on the amount of cryptocurrency (the 
“stake”) an agent owns (King & Nadal, 2012). In 
delegated proof-of-stake, a consensus mechanism for 
permissioned blockchains (see also Table 1), 
stakeholders elect delegates—which are expected to 
behave nonmaliciously—to validate new blocks 
(Zheng, Xie, Dai, Chen, & Wang, 2017). While these 
alternatives to proof-of-work are becoming more 
prominent, they may not be as secure. For instance, 
the “nothing-at-stake” problem may impede 
consensus, given that there is no opportunity cost for 
adding new blocks to every potential fork (Bano et 
al., 2017). However, recent research suggests a key 
assumption underlying the notion of the “nothing-at-
stake” problem may not hold (Saleh, 2018). 
Moreover, ways to address the problem are being 
devised, and major blockchains such as Ethereum 
plan to migrate from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake 
in the future (Buterin & Griffith, 2017). 
A review of applications in practice illustrates that 
trade-offs are indeed occurring between scalability, 
security, and environmental sustainability. For 
instance, Bitcoin appears to be rather secure, but it is 
neither scalable nor environmentally sustainable, 
with a maximum transaction processing capacity 
range estimated at between 3.3 and 7 transactions per 
second (Croman et al., 2016) and an energy 
consumption that may rival Denmark’s.8  
Since the sociomaterial nature of the issues 
identified at the protocol level aligns with our 
discipline’s focus on sociomaterial phenomena, we 
believe that IS research could contribute to studying 
these important trade-offs. Moreover, because issues 
of privacy, scalability, security, and environmental 
sustainability exert constraints on how blockchains 
can be used for applications, a better understanding 
of the interplay between blockchain applications and 
blockchain protocol is needed. Vice versa, decisions 
about design trade-offs at the protocol level are 
contingent on the applications the respective 
blockchain is used for. For example, it has been 
argued that in the case of Steemit, which relies on 
delegated proof-of-stake, it may be acceptable to 
compromise security for scalability, since most value 
transfers are microtransactions.9 In the next section, 
we provide concrete ways for IS researchers from the 
discipline’s three major paradigms to address such 
concerns, in addition to other issues that are 
exclusively situated at the protocol level or 
application level. 
4 An Agenda for Blockchain 
Research in Information 
Systems 
The advent of blockchain opens up intriguing 
opportunities for research within and across the 
blockchain protocol and application levels. New 
theories are needed to address all kinds of important 
questions blockchain gives rise to. To lay the 
foundations for theory development, new 
frameworks are necessary to understand key 
concerns of IS research on blockchain. Such work 
would support the development of theories that 
further our understanding of blockchain as well as its 
impacts. Rigorous empirical research is needed to 
test these novel theories and to test existing theories 
that should be revisited in light of blockchain. In the 
following subsections, we articulate a cross-cutting 
future IS research agenda on blockchain that directs 
attention toward opportunities for research on 
blockchain situated in the behavioral, design, and 
economics research paradigms. 
 
7 In this discussion, we focus on negative environmental 
impacts of blockchain. It has been argued that blockchain 
may be useful to foster environmental sustainability 
(Chapron 2017). This is, however, not a primary issue for 
the blockchain protocol level, but for the application level. 
8 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/ 
2018/02/13/cryptocurrency-mining-in-iceland-is-using-so-
much-energy-the-electricity-may-run-
out/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bd1b0026be6b 
9 https://medium.com/loom-network/scalability-tradeoffs-
why-the-ethereum-killer-hasnt-arrived-yet-8f60a88e46c0 
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Table 2. Agenda for Behavioral IS Research on Blockchain 
Blockchain level Possible areas of inquiry 
Protocol level • What is the role of trust that individuals place in the blockchain system?  
• How can we explain actors’ propensity to pursue Goldfinger attacks? 
• What motivates actors to participate in transaction validation? 
• How are forks in the blockchain protocol initiated at the social level? 
• What are the mechanisms of the interplay between consensus at the social 
level and in the blockchain protocol? 
• How are blockchain-based decentralized autonomous organizations 
governed? 
• How are decision rights allocated? 
• What are the forces that drive (de)centralization of decision rights? 
• Is blockchain changing how accountability is enacted? 
Interactions between protocol level and 
application level 
• How do concerns about applicability shape how the blockchain protocol is 
negotiated? 
• How can application users actualize blockchain’s affordances? 
• How do constraints imposed by the blockchain protocol affect user 
behavior? 
• How do application users change their behavior in the light of openly 
available (albeit pseudonymous) data trails in public blockchains? 
• How does user behavior vary between blockchains that enable 
pseudonymous transactions versus blockchains that enable anonymous 
transactions? 
• How do concerns about security impact user behavior? 
Application level • How does the use of blockchain affect actors’ behavior in the light of de 
facto immutability of data? 
• How can we explain blockchain adoption? 
4.1 A Blockchain Research Agenda for 
Behavioral Information Systems 
Research 
Behavioral (individual, group, and organizational) IS 
research on blockchain has the capacity to make 
contributions across all levels of our framework (see 
Table 2). At the protocol level, the advent of 
blockchain raises issues of trust. While it has been 
argued that blockchains reduce the need for trust, it 
seems likely that at the protocol level, actors using the 
blockchain for applications need to trust both the 
algorithms that make up the actual blockchain 
protocol as well as the agents managing the network. 
The protocol itself may contain bugs which even 
expert developers might fail to detect, whereas the 
agents may have malicious intent. However, the role 
of trust that individuals place in the blockchain is still 
little understood, and research studying the issue of 
trust in blockchain is much needed. Such research is 
linked to issues of security. Typically, it is assumed 
that agents attacking the blockchain’s integrity are 
profit seeking, but the motives agents may have for 
attempting Goldfinger attacks are little understood 
(see also Bonneau, 2018). Similarly, it is mostly 
assumed that agents participating in transaction 
validation are motivated by profit. However, other 
motives may also play a role. Understanding these 
factors might be useful for ultimately designing 
blockchain protocols that are made more secure by 
ensuring incentive alignment. At the protocol level, 
governance issues are particularly interesting (see 
Beck et al., 2018, for a blockchain governance 
framework and research agenda). Even though many 
expect blockchain-based organizations known as 
decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) to 
change organizational governance by decentralizing 
decision rights, these changes have only partly 
materialized (Beck et al., 2018). However, in the case 
of consensus protocols, it is already apparent that 
governance has become decentralized or at least 
decentralizable (Andersen & Ingram Bogusz, 2019; 
Beck et al., 2018; Halaburda & Mueller-Bloch, 2019; 
Hsieh, Vergne, Anderson, Lakhani, & Reitzig, 2018). 
We believe more empirical research is needed to 
reveal how decentralized blockchains really are at this 
point and to study the forces that affect the degree of 
decentralization. This pertains, in particular, to 
decisions directly mediated by the consensus protocol, 
which concern both the transactions added to the 
blockchain and the blockchain protocol itself. For 
instance, Bitcoin is notorious for its centralized 
consensus protocol, which poses a substantial risk to 
the integrity of its blockchain and also controverts its 
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ideology of decentralization. 10  The distribution of 
decision rights in the social world—for instance, at 
conferences, online forums, or within groups of 
blockchain developers—should also be studied 
further, given the hope that decision rights will be 
widely decentralized. Another important issue is 
accountability. Blockchain-based smart contracts may 
enact accountability technologically instead of 
institutionally (Beck et al., 2018), but more empirical 
research is needed to follow up on how the initial 
promises materialize in practice. 
Behavioral IS research can also contribute to a better 
understanding of the interactions between the 
blockchain protocol level and application level. 
Again, governance issues are of importance here. 
Many decisions about the blockchain protocol are 
shaped by concerns about applicability, as the case of 
Bitcoin illustrates (Andersen & Ingram Bogusz, 
2019), but more empirical research is needed to study 
how these decisions are negotiated and eventually 
made. Another important question is how those using 
blockchain actualize its affordances. Initial research is 
emerging, but the replication required for different 
contexts and statistical validation is still lacking (Du, 
Pan, Leidner, & Ying, 2018). In addition, more 
research is needed to study how constraints imposed 
by the blockchain protocol affect the behavior of 
individual application users. In this context, privacy is 
an important issue. For public blockchains, users’ will 
leave openly available data trails, and more research 
is needed to understand how this affects their 
behavior. In particular, changes could be expected for 
pseudonymous (as opposed to anonymous) 
blockchains. Another promising direction for future 
research would be to focus on how individual 
behavior varies between blockchains that enable 
pseudonymous transactions versus those that enable 
anonymous transactions. Overall, a more refined 
understanding of privacy issues is much needed and, 
similarly, more research is needed to better understand 
and explain issues associated with security, given that 
concerns about security are likely to shape user 
behavior.  
At the application level, interesting questions emerge 
about how individual behavior changes in light of de 
facto immutable data (note that this is different from 
openly available data). While individuals are likely to 
become more cautious, IS research is needed to better 
understand how de facto immutable data affect user 
willingness to engage in transactions on the 
blockchain. Another important issue is blockchain 
adoption. Many promising blockchain applications 
have been proposed, but widespread adoption is rare 
(Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017). Future IS research could 
study the antecedents of blockchain adoption and thus 
contribute to addressing the adoption issue. We 
believe regulatory concerns may play an important 
role, but other factors such as protocol issues (in 
particular, privacy, security, and scalability) are likely 
also important. Research on this topic could attempt 
to reveal these factors, thereby contributing not only 
academically but also informing practice.  
Table 3. Agenda for Design Science Research on Blockchain 
Blockchain level Possible areas of inquiry 
Protocol level • How can IS research contribute to designing more environmentally 
sustainable yet secure consensus protocols? 
• What are promising methods for designing consensus protocols? 
Interactions between protocol level and 
application level 
• What are the implications of blockchain protocol design choices for 
blockchain applications? 
• What are promising application areas for blockchain and what are the 
implications for protocol design in terms of design requirements? 
• Are the design assumptions behind new transaction platforms sound? 
• Can we understand and mitigate unintended side effects of new 
blockchain implementations? 
Application level • How can we mitigate the risk of coding errors in blockchain-based smart 
contracts? 
• How can we ensure that oracles provide correct information? 
• What kinds of issues arise when oracles (e.g., sensors and other IoT 
devices) feed blockchains? 
 
10 https://www.ccn.com/bitmains-mining-pools-now-
control-nearly-51-percent-of-the-bitcoin-hashrate 
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4.2 A Blockchain Research Agenda for 
Design Science Research 
Blockchain also creates opportunities for IS 
researchers focusing on design aspects, which cut 
across all levels of our research framework (see 
Table 3). At the protocol level, the key concern is the 
security of consensus protocols, as well as associated 
trade-offs with scalability and environmental 
sustainability. In their current form, consensus 
protocols such as proof-of-work or proof-of-stake 
suffer from severe drawbacks. Design-oriented IS 
research could address these issues. Thus far, design-
oriented research in this area has mainly come from 
computer science, but we believe that design science 
researchers within IS could make valuable 
contributions as well. They could design and 
evaluate alternative consensus protocols that are not 
only technically viable, but also strongly focused on 
human aspects. For instance, such design research 
could incorporate insights from IS economics 
research regarding agents’ incentives and insights 
from behavioral IS research concerning agents’ 
behavior beyond utility maximization. Both may be 
critical in ensuring the security of consensus 
protocols, and design-oriented IS research is well 
poised to study them. Related to such research, IS 
design researchers could also contribute by 
developing methods for designing consensus 
protocols that take human motives into account. 
In terms of the interactions between the protocol and 
application levels, several important issues can be 
addressed by design-oriented IS research. More 
studies are needed to better understand the 
implications of different protocol design choices for 
blockchain applications. Some have argued that 
blockchain is a solution in search for a problem.11 To 
address this concern, one approach to identifying 
promising application areas could be to reflect upon 
salient business and societal problems. Only after 
identifying such problems would the researcher be 
able to identify the constraints exerted by the 
protocol level and propose designs addressing them. 
As blockchain affects established patterns of user 
behavior in sensitive areas—such as changing 
ownership of goods and monetary transactions—it is 
important to conduct trials in different kinds of 
settings and with different prototypes. This would 
naturally lead to using design research (e.g., action 
design research) that promotes testing designs in 
real-world settings and evolving the artifacts during 
their testing (Lindman, Rossi, & Tuunainen, 2017).  
Different blockchains such as Ethereum, 
Hyperledger, and others, afford different things and 
thus restrict the choices of application developers 
and the use cases available. These affordances and 
constraints are crucial for third parties that 
implement new services on top of the blockchain 
protocol level. Critical analysis and evaluations of 
these platforms should result in design principles and 
design theories for future blockchain applications. 
For example, overly naive assumptions about the 
behavior of different stakeholders may create 
security issues, foster bad governance, and erode 
trust in blockchain infrastructures.  The experience 
of Quadriga is a case in point: when the exchange 
founder died, nearly all client deposits vanished.12 
At the application level, a promising research area is 
the design of blockchain-based smart contracts. 
Smart contracts carry great potential but have thus 
far failed to live up to these promises. A major reason 
may be that blockchain-based smart contracts’ 
advantages come at a substantial cost. If smart 
contracts are de facto immutable and autonomously 
executed, coding errors can lead to major 
consequences (Beck et al., 2018). Therefore, 
research is needed to design mechanisms that 
mitigate this risk and study how smart contract 
design can avoid logical errors and software bugs in 
the first place. Another important issue that design-
oriented IS research should address is blockchain 
oracles. Oracles are needed when a smart contract 
stipulates that the execution of a transaction depends 
on a real-world occurrence. In such cases, oracles 
feed the information (stemming from either the 
digital or the physical realm—sensor data in the 
latter case) regarding the conditional event onto the 
blockchain (Xu et al., 2016). This may, however, be 
a problem, given that the information may be 
fraudulent or simply incorrect. Initial research 
proposing ways to address the problem is emerging 
(e.g., Chanson, Bogner, Bilgeri, Fleisch, & 
Wortmann in this special issue), but more studies are 
needed to further design and evaluate artifacts 
capable of mitigating the issue.
 
11  https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/05/ 
31/eight-reasons-to-be-skeptical-about-blockchain/ 
12 https://www.npr.org/2019/03/06/700651500/crypto-mystery-
quadrigas-wallets-are-empty-putting-fate-of-137-million-in-
doubt 
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Table 4. Agenda for Economics of IS Research on Blockchain 
Blockchain level Possible areas of inquiry 
Protocol level • How can we explain agent behavior in consensus protocols? 
• What are security issues and associated tradeoffs in consensus protocols? 
Interactions between protocol level and 
application level 
• How do different blockchain protocols create different logics of value 
creation and value capture? 
• How do changes on the blockchain protocol level affect cryptocurrency 
prices? 
Application level • How does blockchain affect the cost of doing business? 
• How does blockchain affect intermediaries? 
• What are the antecedents, consequences, and boundary conditions of the 
economic changes ascribed to blockchain? 
• What is the role of network effects in blockchains? 
• How do different blockchains compete? 
• What can we learn about initial coin offerings (ICOs)? 
4.3 A Blockchain Research Agenda for 
the Economics of Information 
Systems 
For those studying the economics of IS, the advent of 
blockchain gives rise to multiple fascinating research 
questions across all dimensions of our framework (see 
Table 4). At the protocol level, incentive alignment is 
crucial to ensure secure consensus mechanisms (Beck 
et al., 2018). Future IS research could draw from game 
theory to better understand how incentives structures 
impact agent behavior and thus security in consensus 
mechanisms, as well as associated trade-offs with 
environmental and performance concerns. Research 
along these lines is already emerging: For instance, 
Cong, He, and Li (2018) study centralization and 
decentralization forces in proof-of-work consensus 
mechanisms and argue that risk-sharing drives 
centralization in mining pools. They also present 
evidence consistent with their theoretical argument. 
Saleh (2018) focuses on trade-offs between 
environmental sustainability and security by focusing 
on the viability of the proof-of-stake consensus 
mechanisms as a sustainable alternative to proof-of-
work. The paper introduces a formal economic model 
of proof-of-stake that demonstrates the invalidity of 
the “nothing-at-stake” problem. Overall, more 
research is needed, given that consensus protocols are 
still frequently being undermined.13 
Regarding the interplay of protocol level and 
application level, IS research could investigate how 
different blockchain protocols create different logics of 
value creation and value capture. Initial research on 
this is already emerging (Hua, Chong, Lim, Zheng, and 
Tan in this special issue), but, in particular, the role of 
 
13 https://cryptoslate.com/ethereum-classics-51-percent-
attack-highlights-challenges-proof-work-coins/ 
the blockchain protocol level deserves further 
attention. In particular, it has been argued that 
blockchains are associated with disintermediation, 
however, this most likely depends on the blockchain 
protocol that has been implemented with private 
blockchains unlikely to be associated with removal of 
trusted third parties.  
At the application level, there are intriguing 
opportunities to study the nature of a blockchain-based 
economy. Such a blockchain economy (Beck et al., 
2018; Berg, Davidson, & Potts, 2017) would rely on 
blockchain —for purposes such as payments or for 
record keeping in general —and possibly blockchain-
based smart contracts as well. It has been argued that 
such an economic system reduces the need for 
intermediaries (e.g., Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017) and 
lowers the costs of doing business (e.g., the cost of 
verification and cost of networking) (Catalini & Gans, 
2016). However, more empirical evidence is needed to 
test these hypotheses. Moreover, the theoretical 
arguments need to be refined, particularly with respect 
to their antecedents and consequences. Another 
concern is the boundary conditions of these emerging 
theories. Even if it can be demonstrated that 
blockchain has effects such as disintermediation, this 
is unlikely to be true under all circumstances. 
Blockchain adoption is another important issue 
situated at the application level. Network effects may 
be a decisive factor determining the adoption and 
competition of blockchains. First evidence shows that 
network effects and winner-take-all dynamics drive 
competition between blockchains (Gandal & 
Halaburda, 2016), but more research is needed to 
expand on these findings, particularly regarding how 
competition evolves over time. Studying the switching 
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costs associated with blockchains would be of 
particular interest in this context. Another emerging 
area of research is initial coin offerings (ICOs). For 
instance, Bruckner, Steininger, Veit, and Thatcher 
(2019) analyze factors that influence investments in 
ICOs. Other research shows that the platform-specific 
tokens issued in ICOs can help to address the 
coordination problem in network adoption (Bakos & 
Halaburda, 2018). IS researchers could get more 
involved in understanding and explaining different 
facets of ICOs, and these papers provide a useful 
starting point for research on the topic. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Besides computer science and cryptography studies, 
blockchain has been predominantly discussed in the 
practitioner literature. Rigorous empirical and theory-
driven IS research on blockchain is gradually 
emerging. Our special issue contributes to this new 
area of inquiry. This editorial reviews and expands on 
existing IS research on blockchain by providing a 
framework for blockchain research in IS that directs 
attention to two important issues.  First, our framework 
draws attention to the need for IS researchers to 
consider the blockchain protocol level, which is 
characterized by recursive interactions between human 
agents and the blockchain protocol. Second, our 
framework highlights the need for IS research that 
considers the protocol level constraints and 
affordances of blockchain applications, as well as the 
implications of these constraints at the application 
level for changes at the protocol level. We propose an 
inclusive IS research agenda that emphasizes the need 
for behavioral (individual, group, and organizational), 
design science and IS economics research on 
blockchain. IS scholars conducting such research can 
contribute in several meaningful ways: by developing 
a thorough theoretical understanding of the blockchain 
phenomenon, by testing these theories through 
rigorous empirical research, and by communicating 
research findings to practice.  
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